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A law school graduate should expect to be sued at least three times in
his career.1
In 1989, I thought I understood what my professional responsibilities
were. Now I don't have a clear understanding of what law is
applicable. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
It could happen to any law firm in America. Someone makes a
drafting mistake, overlooks a filing date, or merely misinterprets a
statute or case. The result can be enormous liability that taps not only
into a firm's assets and malpractice insurance policy, but also into the
pockets of individual partners; on the line could be a partner's house,
car, investments, even the Matisse hanging on his wall. Just ask the
partners at the white shoe Wall Street firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman,
Hays & Handler (Kaye Scholer).
Their saga began in June 1986, when Peter M. Fishbein, the
partner in charge of the Lincoln Savings & Loan Association (Lincoln)
account and former chairman of the firm, was called in to help the
thrift through a difficult examination by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, the predecessor agency of the Office of Thrift Supervision
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1. Jennifer E. King, Recent Malpractice Suits Driving Up the Cost of Lawyers Liability
Insurance, ILL. LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 1992, at 27.
2. Amy Stevens, S&L Lawsuits Fail To Answer Questions On Ethical Standards, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 29, 1993, at B12 (quoting Arthur Liebold, a Washington lawyer and former general
counsel of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board).
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(OTS).' After Lincoln failed, regulators claimed "that Kaye Scholer
had concealed damning information about Lincoln from the govern-
ment."4 Regulators further claimed "that the firm had a responsibility
to the public, not just its client."'  In addition to requiring Kaye
Scholer to pay a monetary fine, regulators insisted that Mr. Fishbein
agree to lifetime banishment from practice involving thrifts.6
When Kaye Scholer decided to fight, the OTS answered by filing
administrative charges, seeking $275 million from the firm and an
order permanently barring Mr. Fishbein and three others from practice
involving federally insured banks and thrifts.7 The OTS then froze
the partnership's assets.' Kaye Scholer was thus forced to capitulate
to a $41 million settlement "and the humiliating ostracism of Mr.
Fishbein from bank and thrift practice. ' The first $25 million was
covered by the firm's malpractice insurance, but the partners were left
to pay the remaining $16 million out of their own pockets." ° Other
firms have also been forced to pay huge settlements over work done for
thrifts, including Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (Jones Day), the nation's
second-largest law firm;" Wall Street's Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Whar-
ton & Garrison; 2 and O'Melveny and Myers. 3
The increase in liability that attorneys face today is by no means
limited to the savings and loan (S&L) crisis, however. Changes in
attorney malpractice law and the commercialization of the practice of
3. Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas, Legal Crisis: How a Big Law Firm Was Brought to
Knees By Zealous Regulators-At Kaye Scholer, Survival Prevailed Over Principle As Partnership







10. Richard C. Reuben, Added Protection: Law Firms are Discovering that Limited Liability
Business Structures Can Shield Them From Devastating Malpractice and Double Taxation, A.B.A.
J., Sept. 1994, at 54.
11. Wade Lambert, Jones Day Will Pay $51 Million to Settle Lincoln Savings Case, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 20, 1993, at B12.
12. Richard B. Schmitt, Trial Lawyers Pinpoint Areas for Litigation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9,
1993, at BI.
13. Anthony E. Davis, The Long-Term Implications of the Kaye Scholer Case for Law Firm
Management-Risk Management Comes of Age, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 677, 677 (1994). Other
professionals have also been found liable in similar situations. Besides Kaye Scholer and Jones
Day, the underwriting firm of Offerman & Co. in Minneapolis, the accounting firm of Arthur
Andersen & Co., and the accounting firm of Ernst & Young have all had liability imposed on
them and paid fines arising solely from work done for Lincoln. See Amy Stevens, Ernst & Young
and Jones Day Law Firm To Pay $87 Million in Lincoln S&L Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1992,
at A3.
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law have also contributed to the phenomenon of increased liability. As
a result of this increase, attorneys now take a long, hard look at the
way their firms are organized, often opting for business forms that
offer limited liability. As one commentator recently remarked,
"Throughout the nation .. . [the use of limited liability forms for
professionals] is a tide that is definitely rolling in." 4 Although many
states have for years recognized the personal services corporation, or
PC, two new forms are beginning to loom large on the legal landscape:
the limited liability company (LLC) and the limited liability partner-
ship (LLP)." Both forms seem to offer firms the characteristics they
desire most-limited liability and pass-through taxation. 6
Although many states have embraced the concept of limited
liability for attorneys, approval is not universal. Rhode Island and
California statutorily ban attorneys from practicing in such forms. 7
Further, even those states that have embraced the concept recognize
concerns that, under a limited liability scheme, the quality of attorney
work may suffer, and sufficient funds may not be available for
potential plaintiffs."8
This Comment argues that attorneys should be allowed to limit
their liability by using the LLP and LLC forms to provide relief from
the upsurge of liability because traditional arguments against attorneys'
use of such forms ignore the changes that have taken place in the
practice of law and the dynamic of economic forces, both of which
operate as a counterweight to liability limitation."
14. Reuben, supra note 10, at 54.
15. See Peter Blackman, Limited Liability Option: Experts Weigh the Pros and Cons of
Converting, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 25, 1994, at 5; Christi Harlan, Texas and Louisiana Move to Shield
Personal Assets of Law-Firm Partners, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at A6.
16. See David B. Rae, Limited Liability Partnership: The Time to Become One is Now,
HouS. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 47; Thomas E. Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability
Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (pt. 1), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44, 45 (1992).
Pass-through taxation allows income to flow through to the partners of an entity without
being taxed at the partnership level. The benefit, of course, is that partners do not twice pay
taxes on partnership income, once at a partnership level, and again at their personal level. See
I.R.C. § 701 (1994); Thomas E. Rutledge & Lady E. Booth, The Limited Liability Company Act:
Understanding Kentucky's New Organizational Option, 83 KY. L.J. 1, 7 n.7 (1995).
17. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-3 (Supp. 1992); 1994 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1200 § 93
(Deering). Oregon recently lifted its ban but limited the protection available. See infra notes 62-
63 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 91-95 and 120-122 and accompanying text.
19. The scope of this Comment is limited to consideration of the LLP and LLC forms as
a solution to the problems identified. An evaluation of any or all alternative solutions proposed
by other commentators is not contemplated or intended. This Comment is also limited to the
discussion of issues relating to attorneys. Although accountant liability has also received a great
deal of publicity, the problems faced by accountants are not considered. Additionally, although
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Section II sets out the traditional arguments against allowing
attorneys to limit their liability. It then provides a brief history of
limited liability forms and describes the important characteristics of
PCs, LLCs, and LLPs. Section III examines the forces driving firms
towards limited liability. It looks at the increase in legal malpractice
suits, the impact of the S&L crisis, and changes in the law of attorney
malpractice, all of which have created an untenable situation. Further,
this section examines changes that have occurred in the practice of law,
including changes in how attorneys organize and view their practices,
and the effects those changes have had on malpractice insurance.
Finally, Section IV examines the current legal marketplace from a law
and economics perspective, detailing the factors that drive actors to act
as they do. It further applies that perspective to the behavior and
motivations of attorneys in today's marketplace. This Comment ends
by examining the massive externalizations taking place because of the
current malpractice crisis.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY LANDSCAPE
Traditionally, attorneys have not been permitted to limit their
potential liability to clients. However, limitations on liability such as
those afforded by PCs have recently come into play, and LLPs and
LLCs have also emerged as new possibilities. Part A of this section
sets out the traditional arguments against allowing attorneys to limit
their liability. Part B provides a brief history of how and why
attorneys have organized, and parts C, D, and E examine the PC,
LLC, and LLP forms respectively.
A. The Three Traditional Arguments Against Allowing
Limited Liability
Traditionally, three arguments have been advanced against
allowing attorneys to limit their liability to clients.20 First, courts and
commentators assert that limited liability will thwart a client's
legitimate expectation that the entire firm will be engaged on her
doctors are being sued at an alarming rate, medical malpractice issues are different from those
raised with respect to attorneys because injuries caused by medical malpractice are primarily
physical in nature, while attorney malpractice generally causes only financial injury. See Bryan
Smith, Comment, The Professional Liability Crisis and the Need for Professional Limited Liability
Companies: Washington's Model Approach, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 557, 557 n.5 (1995).
20. See Timothy C. Holm, Nelson v. Patrick: More Problems for Professional Corporations,
64 N.C. L. REV. 1216, 1216-17 (1986).
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behalf.2 The Supreme Court of Georgia echoed this concern when
it wrote:
A lawyer's relationship to his client is a very special one. So also is
the relationship between a lawyer and the other members of his or
her firm. . . . When a client engages the services of a lawyer the
client has the right to expect the fidelity of other members of the
firm. It is inappropriate for the lawyer to be able to play hide-and-
seek in the shadows and folds of the corporate veil and thus escape
the responsibilities of professionalism.22
Second, courts and commentators assert that the practice of law is
a professional service, not a commercial business,23 and that limited
liability might erode "traditionally rigorous notions of legal responsibil-
ity."'24 Courts require professionals to "exercise the learning and skill
ordinarily possessed by members of their profession in the communi-
ty.,,25 Consistent with this requirement for professionals, courts have
required attorneys to exercise "that degree of care, skill, diligence and
knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful
and prudent lawyer in the practice of law."'26  Toward that end,
attorneys have been prohibited from engaging in certain types of
conduct, such as contracting out of the duty of care.27
Finally, courts and commentators assert that limited liability may
leave injured clients with inadequate remedies. 2  This assertion
assumes that unless all of a firm's attorneys can be held personally
liable, a deserving plaintiff may be unable to collect on his or her
judgment.
21. See Birt v. Saint Mary Mercy Hosp. of Gary, Inc., 370 N.E.2d 379, 383 (Ind. Ct. App.
1977) (citing Boris I. Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some
Questions and Comments, 17 TAX L. REV. 1 (1961-62) and Boris I. Bittker, Professional Service
Organizations, A Critique of the Machine, 23 TAX L. REV. 429 (1967-68)).
22. First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (Ga. 1983).
23. See, e.g., id. ("The diligence of this court has been directed toward the assurance that
the law practice will be a professional service and not simply a commercial enterprise."); Holm,
supra note 20, at 1217.
24. Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HARV. L. REV. 776, 789 (1962).
25. Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 120 (Kan. 1984).
26. Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Cook, Flanagan & Berast
v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 395, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968)).
27. See, e.g., Little v. Middleton, 401 S.E.2d 751, 754 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
28. See, e.g., In re Bar Ass'n of Haw., 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Haw. 1973); John Leubsdorf,
Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 141-42 (1995).
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B. A Brief History of Limited Liability Forms
Prior to the 1960s, law firms organized exclusively as partner-
ships.2 9 Incorporation of professional organizations was so unusual
that some states required approval by the state legislature,30 and
others denied it altogether'.3  The noncorporate status of the profes-
sional was considered necessary to preserve for clients "the benefits of
a highly confidential relationship based upon personal confidence,
ability, and integrity."32 Unlike other businesspersons, attorneys were
(and in some states are still) viewed primarily as public service
providers? 3 Some states feared that professionals, if allowed to
incorporate, would emphasize the business aspect of their professions
rather than the service aspect, and clients would suffer as a result.34
The 1960s, however, saw the advent of "traditional" PC statutes.
Interestingly, the adoptions of the first PC statutes were driven by
professionals who wanted corporate tax status, not limited liability.
3
Because professionals were historically organized as partnerships, they
were taxed as such; thus, they were unable to obtain any of the
employee fringe benefits available only to corporations. 36  A few
partnerships found relief in 1960 when the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) adopted the Kintner Regulations, 37 under which professional
associations could be taxed as corporations if they exhibited at least
29. See 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 15.05, at 15-5 (1994 & Supp. 1994).
30. See Lee Lublin et al., Partnership Structure Called In Question as Liability Rises, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., June 19, 1992, at 5.
31. Holm, supra note 20, at 1216-17; see also Stephen E. Kalish, Lawyer Liability and
Incorporation of the Law Firm: A Compromise Model Providing Lawyer-Owners with Limited
Liability and Imposing Broad Vicarious Liability on Some Lawyer-Employees, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 563,
563 (1987).
32. In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 1961).
33. For example, the Supreme Court of Georgia commented,
The diligence of this court has been directed toward the assurance that the law practice
will be a professional service and not simply a commercial enterprise. The primary
distinction is that a profession is a calling which demands adherence to the public
interest as the foremost obligation of the practitioner.
Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d at 675; see also In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d at 556 ("This necessary personal
relationship imposes upon the lawyer a standard of duty and responsibility which does not apply
in the ordinary commercial relationship.... The corporate entity as a method of doing business
will not be permitted to protect the unfaithful or unethical.").
34. See, e.g., Zagoia, 302 S.E.2d at 675; In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d at 556.
35. See Holm, supra note 20, at 1216-17.
36. See J. Timothy Phillips et al., Origins of Tax Law: The History of the Personal Service
Corporation, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 433, 439 (1983) (listing, for example, corporate retirement
plans).
37. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -11 (1960).
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three of the following four criteria: (1) centralized management, (2)
continuity of life, (3) transferability of interest, and (4) limited liability
for all investors.38  Unfortunately, it was nearly impossible for most
professionals to meet this standard, and they responded by pressuring
state legislatures to pass laws enabling them to organize as corpora-
tions. 39 By 1970, virtually all states had adopted enabling mecha-
nisms for lawyers to practice as professional service corporations,40
primarily so that professionals could obtain "equal footing with other
taxpayers."'" Yet, in spite of this availability, most law firms were
still organized as general partnerships.42
The LLC was the next organizational form to emerge, and it was
completely different from forms previously available. The first LLC
statute was enacted in Wyoming in 1977, 43 and the second was
enacted in Florida in 1982."4 The Wyoming LLC statute was used
for mining leases, and its principal utility was found in its "unique
blend of limited liability and tax status as a pass-through entity."4
The Florida statute was designed to lure capital into the state.46
Beyond these specifics, there is very little information on exactly where
the idea for LLCs came from or for what use they would be most
appropriate.47
Despite the enactment of these early LLC statutes, the popularity
of LLCs did not explode until 1990 when the IRS ruled that Wyoming
38. See United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1954).
39. Timothy J. O'Hearn, Note, Professional Corporations-Shareholder Liability in Ohio:
Confounding Attorneys and Others, 17 AKRON L. REV. 143, 145-46 (1983).
40. See Holm, supra note 20, at 1218 n.31.
41. In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d at 556; see also In re Bar Ass'n of Haw., 516 P.2d at 1268
("We are mindful that petitioner's principal motive... is to enable the attorneys of this State to
qualify for the federal tax advantages which would accompany such incorporation."); In re Rhode
Island Bar Ass'n, 263 A.2d 692, 695 (R.I. 1970) ("The professional service corporation law in this
state was enacted for the purpose of enabling members of the covered professions, not previously
allowed to incorporate, to form corporations, thus putting such members on an equal footing with
other taxpayers").
42. See Sheldon I. Banoff, New Ruling Adds Further Encouragement for Large Firms to Form
LLCs, 81 J. TAx'N 12, 12 (1994).
43. WYO. STAT. § 17-15-101 to -125 (1994); see 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 29,
§ 1.06, at 1-7.
44. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.0101 to 621.15 (West Supp. 1994). See Brian L. Schorr,
Limited Liability Companies: Considerations in Choosing a Business Entity, in FORMING AND
USING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIEs 149, 150 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B4-7031, 1993).
45. See Geu, supra note 16, at 48 n.28 (quoting Thomas N. Lung, The Limited Liability
Company 3 (Feb. 15, 1989) (unpublished paper on file with the Wyoming Secretary of State)).
46. See Richard Johnson, Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 11 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 387, 387 (1983).
47. See Geu, supra note 16, at 50.
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LLCs would be treated as partnerships for federal tax purposes."
Since then, a majority of states have adopted LLC statutes,49 some of
which expressly allow attorneys to organize under them, and some of
which are silent on the subject."
The third organizational form to emerge was the LLP. Similar to
LLCs, LLPs provide "greater protection for [their] members.""
These protections, while similar, are not identical.52 However, LLPs
are far easier to create from existing partnerships than are LLCs
because, in many states, partnerships can convert to LLPs merely by
amending their partnership agreements.53
The first LLP statute was enacted in Texas in 1991, 4 followed
48. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; see also Jimmy G. McLaughlin, The Limited Liability
Company: A Prime Choice for Professionals, 45 ALA. L. REV. 231, 232 (1993).
49. ALA. CODE § 10-12-4(s) (Supp. 1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.010 (West Supp. 1995);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-841 to -847 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-103 (Michie
Supp. 1993); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000-17705 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-
101 to 7-80-1101 (West Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-9 (West 1994); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to 18-1107 (Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1301 to 29-1375 (Supp.
1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 621.02 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(f) (Supp.
1993); IDAHO CODE § 53-605 (Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/1-1 to 180/60-1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE § 23-18-2-2 (Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE §§ 490.1500-1518
(Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7604(q) (Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.005
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301-02 (West 1993); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 611 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A.203(9) (1992);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.4901 (Supp. 1994-95); MINN. STAT. § 319A.03, 322B.12 (Supp.
1993); 1994 Miss. Laws 403; MO. REV. STAT. § 347.015, .035 (Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-8-1301 (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2603(15) (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 86.011-.571 (Michie 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-D (Supp. 1993); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 42:2B-1 to 42:2B-70 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-1 to 53-19-74 (Michie
Supp. 1993); N.Y. LIM. LLAB. CO. LAW § 1201 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 57C-2-01 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-31-03.1 (Supp. 1993); 1994 Ohio Laws 74; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.001-990 (1993);
1994 Pa. Laws 106; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-1 et seq. (1995); 1994 S.C. Acts 448; S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 47-13A-1, 13B-1 (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-248-101, -202 (1994);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-105(1)(r)
(Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1100 (Michie Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.045
(1994); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-1 to 31-1A-69 (Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-103(b) (1994).
50. Some states that omitted any mention of professionals in their LLC statutes have since
recognized the use of LLCs by professionals in other statutes. For example, the Colorado
Supreme Court has modified Rule 265 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure to allow
attorneys to practice as LLCs. COLO. R. CIV. P. 265 (1990 & Supp. 1995). This change,
without statutory recognition, could cause problems in the future. See Smith, supra note 19, at
577.
51. Michael J. Lawrence, Note, The Fortified Law Firm: Limited Liability Business and the
Propriety of Lawyer Incorporation, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 207, 213 (1995).
52. See id.
53. See id.; see also infra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
54. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (West 1993). As of January 1, 1994, most
Texas LLPs are governed by the provisions of Texas House Bill No. 273, which was enacted in
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by Louisiana in 1992,11 and Delaware in 1993.6 Since then, many
other states have enacted similar legislation. 7
C. The Professional Services Corporation-The Outmoded Standard
Currently, attorneys may incorporate as PCs in all fifty states.5 8
Because PCs provide limited liability for shareholders,59 LLPs and
LLCs are ostensibly unnecessary. However, tax disadvantages, the
disregard of liability limitations in some states, and restrictions on
interstate practice make PCs inefficient and ineffective vehicles for
professionals to limit their liability.
First, without LLCs and LLPs, attorneys are forced to choose
between the pass-through taxation provided by the partnership form
and the limitation on liability provided with the PC form. As
corporate entities, PCs are subject to double taxation of income.60
Consequently, at current tax rates, PC members often end up with less
than fifty cents for every dollar of pre-tax profits distributed to them
as bonuses.6
1993 as the Texas Revised Partnership Act (to be codified as 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 917, § 9
(Vernon)).
55. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3431-35 (West 1993).
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1501-1547 (1993).
57. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-244 to -257 (Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-61-101 to 7-61-130 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-9 to 34-38 (West Supp.
1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 41-413 (1993); 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 95-242, S.B. No. 2296 (West
1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-62 (Harrison 1995); IDAHO CODE § 53-343A-C (1995); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 205/8.1 (Smith-Hurd 1994); 1995 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 230-1995
(West); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 486.44-.45 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56.301-347 (1994);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.555 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
Ass'NS § 9-703 (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 449.44-.48 (Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT.
§§ 3.19A.01-.22 (1994); 1995 Miss. Laws H.B. No. 1032; 1995 Mo. Legis. Serv. H.B. No. 558
(Vernon); 1995 Mont. Laws 449; 1995 Nev. Stat. 465; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2A-1 to 42:2A-72
(West 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-1-45 to -48 (Michie 1995); N.Y.
PARTNERSHIP LAW Ch. 38, Art. 8-B (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-84.2 to
.3 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 45-22-01 to 45-22-19 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1775.61-.63 (Baldwin 1995); 1995 Or. Laws ch. 93; PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 12701-12793
(1967 & Supp. 1995); 1995 S.C. Acts 448, § 2; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 48-7-101 to 48-7-
1105 (1991 & Supp. 1995); 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts 403; UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-42 (West
1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-43.1 (Michie 1994); 1995 Wash. Legis. Serv. 337 (West).
58. Karen M. Maycheck, Comment, Shareholder Liability in Professional Legal CoipoTations:
A Survey of the States, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 817, 817 (1986).
59. See Holm, supra note 20, at 1216-17.
60. See I.R.C. § 11(b)(2) (Supp. 1991) (denying graduated tax rates to professional service
corporations).
61. See Smith, supra note 19, at 579 n.165 (explaining that under current tax law, the profits
of PCs are taxed at a corporate rate, and then the partners must pay personal tax after
distribution).
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Second, a number of states do not adhere to the limitations on
liability that PCs ostensibly provide to their shareholders. For
example, the Oregon professional corporation statute provides that
shareholders of professional corporations may be held jointly and
severally liable with all other shareholders of the corporation for"negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct committed by any share-
holder, or by a person under the direct supervision and control of any
shareholder in the rendering of professional services on behalf of the
corporation to a person receiving the service."62 The only limitation
on liability provided by the statute is for "other contractual obligations
of the corporation."63
Further, other PC statutes have been rendered useless by
judiciaries who either refuse to give weight to liability limitations
contained in PC statutes or otherwise disregard the statutes' liability
restrictions. For example, the Georgia PC statute,64 which appears
to limit liability, was eviscerated by the Supreme Court of Georgia in
1983.65 The court held that attorneys who hold themselves out as
members of a law firm are jointly and severally liable for all malprac-
tice claims made against the firm.66 The court commented, "We
make no distinction between partnerships and professional corporations
in this respect. We cannot allow a corporate veil to hang from the
cornices of professional corporations which engage in the law prac-
tice."67  The Supreme Court of Hawaii acted similarly after the
Hawaii Legislature passed a PC statute6" limiting liability.6 9 The
court allowed organization as PCs for tax purposes, but forbade
liability limitations.70
62. OR. REV. STAT. § 58.185(2)(c) (Supp. 1994). However, each partner's liability is
capped at $300,000 per year. OR. REV. STAT. § 58.185(5) (Supp. 1994). These statutes also
apply to professionals organized as LLCs and LLPs. See 1995 OR. LAWS 63.074(2); 1995 OR.
LAWS 68.270(6). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-905 (1977); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.99(8) (West Supp. 1985).
63. OR. REV. STAT. § 58.185(7) (Supp. 1994).
64. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-7-7 (1980).
65. See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983); see also Zimmerman
v. Hogg & Allen, 207 S.E.2d 267, 268 (N.C. Ct. App.) (dealing with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55B-9
(1993)), rev'd on other grounds, 209 S.E.2d 795 (N.C. 1974). But see Nelson v. Patrick, 326 S.E.2d
45 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (dealing with medical professional corporations)..
66. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d at 676.
67. Id.
68. HAW. REV. STAT. § 415A-11(b) (1988).
69. See In re Bar Ass'n of Haw., 516 P.2d 1267 (Haw. 1973).
70. Id. at 1268 (holding that "adoption would not provide adequate protection to a client's
claims against a law corporation"); see also Vinall v. Hoffnan, 651 P.2d 850, 851 (Ariz. 1982)
(discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-909 (1977)); Anderson v. McBurney, 467 N.W.2d 158,
163 & n.7 (1991) (discussing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.99(8) (West. Supp. 1985)).
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Third, some PC statutes contain limits on interstate practice.71
This nullifies much of a firm's liability protection, as many firms have
business interests in multiple states." Currently, no LLC or LLP
legislation restricts a firm's interstate volume.
73
D. The Limited Liability Company-The New Kid on the Block
1. Typical Provisions for Formation 74
To form an LLC, a certificate of formation must be filed with the
appropriate state agency.7 This certificate must set forth: the name
of the LLC;7 6 the address of the registered office and agent for service
of process; 77 the address of the LLC's principal place of business;
7
the specific date of dissolution if one exists;79 a statement that the
management of the LLC is vested in a manager or managers if that
decision is made; 0 the names and addresses of all members;"1 the
period of duration, which may be perpetual; 2 the purpose for which
the LLC is organized; 3 and anything else the members choose to
include. 4
71. See Thomas W. Rimerman, The Need for Expanding Organizational Options for CPAs,
J. ACCT., Oct. 1991, at 45.
72. See Smith, supra note 19, at 580.
73. See Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of The Emerging
Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375, 447 (1992).
74. Texas and Washington have representative LLC statutes. Accordingly, the analysis in
this Comment is based on the provisions in those states. To the extent that statutes in other
states differ, the analysis in this section may or may not apply.
75. The Secretary of State is usually the proper agency. E.g., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528n-11.01(A)(1) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.070(1) (1994).
76. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-3.02(A)(1) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE § 25.15.070(lXa) (1994).
77. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-2.06(AX2)-(3) (West Supp. 1995); WASH.
REV. CODE § 25.15.070(l)(b) (1994).
78. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-2.02(4) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 2 5.15.070(1)(c) (1994).
79. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-3.02( 2 ) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 25.15.070(1)(d) (1994).
80. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-3.02A(5) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE § 25.15.070(1)(e) (1994).
81. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-3.02A(6) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE § 2 5.1 5.070(lXg) (1994).
82. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-3.02A(2) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE § 25.15.070(1)(d) (1994).
83. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-3.02(3), 1.01A(i)(b). Washington does not
require this.
84. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-3.02A(8) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE § 25.15.070(lXf) (1994).
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Additionally, the name of the organization must include "Limited
Liability Company," "Limited Liability Co.," or "L.L.C." s LLCs
also must maintain a registered office 6 and a registered agent for
service of process.8 7 Washington requires LLCs to deliver their
annual reports to the Secretary of State in order to keep all information
current.8 8 Although Texas does not have that requirement, the Texas
Secretary of State does have the right to propound interrogatories to
any LLC, and these interrogatories must be answered under oath.8 9
Finally, foreign LLCs may register and do business in both states.9
The principal difference between the Texas and Washington
statutes is that professionals organizing as Texas LLCs are not
required to maintain liability insurance, while Washington requires
professional LLCs to carry at least one million dollars of malpractice
insurance or its equivalent to ensure protection from personal
liability.9' Another significant difference is that in Texas, each LLC
may render only one specific type of professional service, while
Washington has no such express limitation.
92
Personal liability for LLC members is unchanged from that under
traditional forms. Attorneys who commit negligent or fraudulent acts
subjecting them to liability under current PC or partnership statutes
85. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-11.02(A) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE § 25.15.070(1)(a) (1994).
86. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-2.05(A)(1) (West Supp. 1995), WASH. REV.
CODE § 25.15.020(1Xa) (1994). The registered office "may but need not be a place of its business
in" the state. WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.020(1)(a) (1994).
87. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-2.05(A)(2) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE § 25.15.020(1)(b) (1994).
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.105 (1994). Texas requires only that any changes be filed
with the Secretary of State. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-2.06(A) (West Supp.
1995).
89. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-8.01(A) (West Supp. 1995).
90. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-2.06 (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 25.15.315 (1994).
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.045(2) (1994). The statute provides:
If the company's members are required to be licensed to practice such profession, and
the company fails to maintain for itself and for its members practicing in this state a
policy of professional liability insurance, bond, or other evidence of financial
responsibility of a kind designated by rule by the state insurance commissioner and in
the amount of at least one million dollars or such greater amount as the state insurance
commissioner may establish by rule for a licensed profession or for any specialty within
a profession, taking into account the nature and size of the business, then the company's
members shall be personally liable to the extent that, had such insurance, bond, or other
evidence of responsibility been maintained, it would have covered the liability in
question.
Id.
92. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n-11.01A(2) (West Supp. 1995).
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remain personally liable under typical LLC statutes." For example,
the Texas Legislature provided that "[t]his Act does not remove or
diminish any rights at law that a person receiving professional service
has against a person rendering the service for an error, an omission,
negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance. '' 94 Additionally, the LLC
itself is jointly and severally liable for any acts performed by a member
during the course of employment. 95
2. The LLC-Leaving Many Questions Unanswered
LLC legislation is often problematic because of its brevity96 and
because no specific analogue for LLC choice of law problems has been
adopted. 97 For example, questions remain regarding the appropriate-
ness of traditional concepts of partner liability, particularly in
connection with the potential liability of partners for the tortious
conduct of other partners.9"
Additionally, questions exist as to whether or not case law
regarding piercing of the corporate veil is appropriate in situations
involving LLCs. Thus far, only Colorado has given a definitive "yes,"
although commentators anticipate that other jurisdictions may
follow.99 For example, statutory changes brought on by the Georgia
Revised Limited Partnership Act may signal the application of veil-
piercing case law to LLCs."' Washington has apparently followed
suit, providing that members of an LLC are "[p]ersonally liable for
93. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528 n-ll.05A (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE § 25.15.045 (1994).
94. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528 n-11.05A (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE § 25.15.045 (1994).
95. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528 n-11.05A (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE § 25.15.045 (1994).
96. See, e.g., Eddy J. Rogers, Jr. & Blakely R. Stinebaugh, New Possibilities For Texas
Business Organizations: Limited Liability Companies, TEX. B.J., July 1992, at 666 (indicating
aspects of Texas Act undeveloped as of yet).
97. See id. at 670-71.
98. See id. at 670.
99. The Colorado LLC Act provides:
In any case in which a party seeks to hold the members of a limited liability company
personally responsible for the alleged improper actions of the limited liability company,
the court shall apply the case law which interprets the conditions and circumstances
under which the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under Colorado law.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-107(1) (Supp. 1994). For an analysis of veil piercing in the LLC
context, see Joseph P. Fonfara & Corey A. McCool, Comment, The Wyoming Limited Liability
Company: A Viable Alternative to the S Corporation and the Limited Partnership?, 23 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 523, 531-32 (1988).
100. See Keatinge, supra note 73, at 445 (explaining that because Georgia has eliminated
the control rule, corporate veil piercing precedents may apply).
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any act, debt, obligation, or liability of the limited liability company to
the extent that shareholders of a Washington business corporation
would be liable in analogous circumstances.' 1 1 The statute goes on
to say that courts may consider case law developed with regard to
piercing the corporate veil of business corporations. 2 To date, no
uniform law has emerged on the subject of veil piercing, although the
ABA has a committee looking into drafting a uniform act.103
E. The Limited Liability Partnership-Modification of an
Existing Standard
1. Typical Provisions for Formation' °
To form an LLP, an existing partnership must file an applica-
tion o with the appropriate state agency,0 6 stating information
such as the following: the name of the partnership;' 7 the address of
its principal office, and for partnerships not in the state, the address of
a registered office and the name and address of a registered agent for
service of process in the state; 08 and a brief statement of the business
in which the partnership engages. 1°9 In addition, the typical statute
requires payment of an annual fee based upon the number of part-
ners;" the addition of the words "Registered Limited Liability
Partnership" or the abbreviation "L.L.P." to the firm name;"' and
101. WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.060 (1994).
102. Id.
103. See Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a Race
Between States, But Heading Where?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1193, 1233-35 (1995).
104. Delaware and Texas LLP statutes are typical. To the extent that statutes differ from
those in Delaware and Texas, this Comment may or may not apply.
105. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1544(a) (1993); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-
3.08(b)(4) (West Supp. 1995).
106. The Secretary of State is usually the appropriate agency. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 1544(a) (1993); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08(bX1) (West Supp. 1995).
107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1544(a)(1) (1993); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-
3.08(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
108. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1544(a)(2)-(3) (1993) (Delaware LLPs have a continuing
duty to maintain a registered office and agent.); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-
3.08(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1995) (Texas does not require LLPs to maintain a registered agent for
the service of process.).
109. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1544(a)(4) (1993); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-
3.08(b)(1)(E) (West Supp. 1995).
110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1544(c) (1993) ($100 per partner, which is capped by the
maximum annual corporation franchise tax as specified in § 503(c) of title 8); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08(b)(3) (West Supp. 1995) ($200 per partner).
111. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1545 (1993); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-
3.08(c) (West Supp. 1995).
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the execution of the application by a majority of the partners or by one
or more partners authorized to execute such an application." 2
Further, LLPs typically must carry malpractice insurance, or post
a bond or similar deposit "of a kind that is designed to cover the kinds
of negligence, wrongful acts, and misconduct for which liability is
limited ... and which insures the partnership and its partners.""' 3
If an LLP is in compliance with the insurance requirements, those
requirements shall not be admissible or made known to the jury in
determining liability for the extent of a debt, an obligation, or
damages." 4
2. Future Implications
Many of the provisions in LLPs resemble those of the Uniform
Partnership Act, as many states have merely revised their limited
partnership acts to allow for LLPs."' Consequently, courts are
likely to rely on traditional partnership law in addressing LLP choice
of law problems. Further, the "internal affairs doctrine," which gives
controlling weight to the laws of the state in which organizations such
as corporations and limited partnerships are organized, may apply to
LLPs." 6  The Texas Legislature, for example, specifically included
such a provision in its LLP legislation." 7
Although negative implications accompanying LLPs are minimal,
two seem possible. First, none of the current LLP legislation defines
the terms used in its lists of excused conduct. However, because many
112. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1544(b) (1993); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-
3.08(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
113. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1546(a) (1993). Delaware requires a minimum of
$1,000,000 of insurance or "$1,000,000 of funds specifically designated and segregated for the
satisfaction of judgments against the partnership or its partners based on the kinds of negligence,
wrongful acts, and misconduct for which liability is limited... " DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 1546(d) (1993). Texas has an almost identical statute, except that the minimum amount is
$100,000. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08(d)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
114. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1546(c) (1993); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b-3.08(d)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
115. Alson R. Martin, Limited Liability Companies (LLCs): The New Game In Town, in
ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE FAMILY BUSINESS OWNER 89,
143 (1994); see also R. Dennis Anderson et al., Registered LLPs, TEX. B.J., July 1992, at 728
(explaining that Texas's LLP act was "authorized by amendments to the Texas Uniform
Partnership Act").
116. Cf. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9.01 (adopted in many states); 59A AM.
JUR. 2D Partnership § 30 (1987 & Supp. 1995); Annotation, Conflict of Laws as to Partnership
Matters, 29 A.L.R. 2D 295, 306-09 (1953).
117. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-9.01(a) (West Supp. 1995), overruling Ayub
v. Automobile Mortgage Co., 252 S.W. 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), rev'd, 266 S.W. 134 (Tex.
Com. App. 1924)).
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of the lists appear to have originated in the provisions of PC statutes,
the definitions in the PC statutes will likely be used."' Second,
certain partners in the same firm may be more likely than others to be
held liable for malpractice judgments. Consequently, partners in high-
risk departments, such as mergers and acquisitions, may become the
target of ire from partners in less risk-prone departments. 119
Individual negligence, fraud, and malpractice are not excused
under LLP statutes. Attorneys who commit negligent or fraudulent
acts subjecting them to liability under current PC or partnership
statutes remain personally liable under typical LLP statutes.120 For
example, if two partners are jointly working on a project, and one
makes a mistake that the other knows about (or reasonably should
know about) but fails to take reasonable steps to fix, both partners are
liable.' 2 ' Additionally, joint and several liability for partnership
debts arising out of obligations such as contracts and mortgages
remains intact. 22
III. FORCES DRIVING NEW BUSINESS FORMS-THE
MALPRACTICE CRISIS
Professionals are probably the most prevalent users of limited
liability business forms. As one commentator has noted, the principal
benefit derived from limited liability forms is "peace of mind."'23 As
a practical matter, partners' personal assets are at risk in a malpractice
suit only when all of the firm assets and malpractice insurance have
been depleted, something that has rarely happened.'24 Yet, attorneys
are worried.'25 These worries are principally fueled by an increase
in malpractice suits, actions taken by government regulators in the
wake of the S&L crisis, revisions in the rules governing attorney
malpractice, erosion of the partnership tradition, and increases in the
cost of malpractice insurance coupled with decreases in coverage.
118. Cf. Anderson, supra note 115, at 729-30 (dealing with the term "Representative").
119. Edward A. Adams, Firms Expected to Make Switch to New Format: Limited Liability
Partnerships Seen Restricting Exposure, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 1994, at 1.
120. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 1515(b) (Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 6132b-3.08(a) (West Supp. 1995).
121. See, e.g., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08(a)(1)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1995).
122. See, e.g., id. art. 6132b-3.08(a)(2).
123. Milo Geyelin, Lawyers Are Moving to Protect Own Assets in Case of a Suit, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 2, 1994, at B3.
124. See Adams, supra note 119, at 2.
125. See Stevens, supra note 2, at B12.
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A. Increase in Malpractice Suits
In recent years, the frequency of malpractice claims against
lawyers has soared," 6 and large verdicts against attorneys are no
longer an uncommon occurrence.'27 Further, law firm liability expo-
sure-and that of its partners-has climbed sharply with the increase
in the size of business transactions that major corporate law firms now
routinely handle."' Even more distressing is the extreme imbalance
that exists between the fee collected by the firm and the amount of
money involved in a transaction, which is typically the amount for
which the firm can be sued.'29 Moreover, liability insurance, particu-
larly for smaller firms, may cover only a fraction of the funds at stake
in big transactions. 30
An additional cause for concern is that law firms are finding
themselves liable in situations they never before anticipated.' 3' For
example, in Washington State Physicians Insurance Exchange & Ass'n
v. Fisons Corp.,132 liability was imposed on a firm for acts that the
firm's partners never imagined could subject them to liability. In
Fisons, the Washington Supreme Court determined that sanctions
should be imposed against one of Seattle's largest firms, Bogle &
Gates, for discovery abuses.' 3 The court made this determination
despite the fact that many large litigation firms in Washington filed
declarations stating that Bogle & Gates had followed the same
discovery practices that Washington litigation firms have followed for
years, 3 4 and prominent legal ethics experts filed declarations stating
126. See Sheldon G. Larky, Legal Negligence: Strategies to Avoid Law-Practice Pitfalls,
TRIAL, Feb. 1987, at 30, 31 (showing evidence that legal malpractice claims rose from one for
every fifty lawyers in 1980 to one for every seventeen lawyers in 1985); Donna K.H. Walters,
New Liability Twist Has Lawyers, Accountants Scurrying, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at D1
(explaining that law firms are so worried about potential liability that many now review the
riskiness of each potential new client before deciding whether or not to accept it as a client).
127. See King, supra note 1, at 28 (explaining that the numbers involved are "mind-
boggling").
128. Geyelin, supra note 123, at B3.
129. See King, supra note 1, at 28.
130. See Geyelin, supra note 123, at B3.
131. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
132. 122 Wash. 2d 299, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993).
133. Id. at 344-45, 858 P.2d at 1078.
134. See, e.g., Smith Affidavit at 3, Fisons (No. 57696-3) (Chairman of Litigation
Department at Davis Wright Tremaine, Seattle, Washington); McNaul Affidavit at 4, Fisons (No.
57696-3) (partner in charge of Litigation Department at Culp, Guterson & Grader, Seattle,
Washington); Greenan Affidavit at 8, 10, Fisons (No. 57696-3) (senior partner specializing in
complex litigation at Schwabe Williamson Ferguson & Burdell, Seattle, Washington, member of
Washington State Bar Association Permanent Committee on Character and Fitness); Gerrand
19961
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that they saw no ethical violations.13 Fisons underscored the funda-
mental dichotomy that attorneys regularly face: how to balance the
role of zealous advocate with the role of officer of the court.
The uncertainty in the standards to which they will be held is a
compelling impetus for attorneys seeking limited liability forms.
Nowhere has this uncertainty been more drastically illustrated than in
the S&L crisis.
B. The Savings and Loan Crisis
In recent years, the federal government has brought more than
150 claims against law firms involved in thrift bailouts,' 36 with more
than half of those arising from the S&L crisis." 7 Although none of
the cases have been submitted to a jury, many resulted in large settle-
ments. Some of the larger settlements include:
- Wall Street's Kaye Scholer's settlement with the OTS for $41
million.3 8 The settlement came after the OTS filed administra-
tive charges seeking $275 million from Kaye Scholer and froze the
partnership's assets.3 9
- A $51 million settlement between Jones Day, the nation's second-
largest law firm with more than 1,000 lawyers, and the Resolution
Trust Company (RTC) over Jones Day's role in the breakup of
Lincoln Savings & Loan.'40
- Wall Street's Paul, Weiss, Rifkin, Wharton & Garrison's
settlement with the RTC for $45 million over its representation
of CenTrust Savings Bank.'
Affidavit at 4-5, Fisons (No. 57696-3) (Chairman of Aviation and Products Liability Department
at Perkins Coie, Seattle, Washington); Moceri Affidavit at 4-5, Fisons (No. 57696-3) (senior
litigation partner at Reed McClure, Seattle, Washington); Tausend Affidavit at 8-10, 13, Fisons
(No. 57696-3) (partner at Preston Gates & Ellis, Seattle, Washington, former Dean of the
University of Puget Sound School of Law).
135. See, e.g., Boerner Declaration at 3, 10-11, Fisons (No. 57696-3) (Associate Professor
of Law at Seattle University School of Law teaching Professional Responsibility, former chair of
Rules and Professional Conduct Committee of the Washington State Bar Association); Hazard
Affidavit at 9, Fisons (No. 57696-3) (Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School, Director of
American Law Institute).
136. See Stevens, supra note 2, at B12.
137. See Linda Hamelstein, S & L Spotlight Focusing on Malpractice, RECORDER, Nov. 20,
1990, at 1.
138. See Stevens & Thomas, supra note 3, at Al.
139. See Reuben, supra note 10, at 55-56.
140. Lambert, supra note 11, at B12.
141. See Stevens, supra note 2, at B12.
[Vol. 19:349
1996] Limited Liability Partnerships and Companies 367
As of mid-1992, over ninety cases were still pending against law firms
for the S&L debacle alone.142 Attorneys and their insurers have paid
out roughly $400 million in response. 143  To date, few firms have,
like Kaye Scholer, exceeded their malpractice coverage. 14 In the near
future, however, firms are likely to be faced with claims that drastically
exceed their policy limits. According to Robert O'Malley, loss
prevention counsel for the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society,
which insures 370 firms, "[I]n the next five years, it is quite possible
some [firm] will face a $150 million or $200 million judgment.'
14
At a time when attorneys are being charged with violating their
ethical duties at an unprecedented rate, no court has spoken with
finality to whether the standards applied by government agencies are
correct. 146  The Kaye Scholer case discussed in the introduction is a
case in point. Kaye Scholer attorneys thought they were properly and
ethically serving their client. 4 7 In fact, the firm paid approximately
$10,000 for an evaluation from Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., a Yale Law
School ethics professor who has played a pivotal role in the develop-
ment of lawyers' rules of conduct. According to Professor Hazard, had
Mr. Fishbein and Kaye Scholer volunteered the information that the
OTS said it should have, the lawyers would have violated their ethical
duties to their client. 48  A disciplinary committee of the New York
Bar Association has since looked into the case and found no evidence
that any Kaye Scholer partner violated ethical rules. 149  However,
because the firm's assets were frozen, paying employees, partners, and
suppliers became impossible.' Settlement was its only option.
142. Edward A. Adams, Thrift Litigation Fallout Suits Increasing; Firm Grip Sought, N.Y.
L.J., June 18, 1992, at 5.
143. See id.; see also Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the Savings and Loan Crisis,
1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 53, 53. Mr. Weinstein notes that in the four years ending in October
1992, there were over "1000 criminal cases and nearly 2000 civil cases arising from the savings
and loan crisis. These include more than ninety civil cases brought against lawyers." Id.
144. Adams, supra note 119, at 1.
145. Id.
146. See Stevens, supra note 2, at B12.
147. See Arkansas Forbearance, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994, at A20 (editorial).
148. See Stevens & Thomas, supra note 3, at Al.
149. Arkansas Forbearance, supra note 147, at A20. In addition, Mr. Fishbein was cleared
after an exhaustive sua sponte investigation by the New York Departmental Disciplinary
Committee. See Letter Clearing Lincoln S&L Lawyer, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1993-Jan. 3, 1994,
at 10 (reprinting letter written by Hal R. Lieberman); Amy Stevens, Kaye Scholer Partner Cleared
by Law Board In Lincoln S&1L Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1993, at B8.
150. See Stevens & Thomas, supra note 3, at A5.
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C. Changes in the Law of Liability
Changes in legal malpractice law have also contributed to the
increase in liability for attorneys, thus encouraging them to seek new
business forms."' Specifically, revisions have occurred in areas such
as statutes of limitations, privity, and the duty of care." 2
First, statutes of limitations" 3 have changed dramatically from
the 1960s, when they were "extremely favorable to legal malpractice
defendants."' 54 In the 1960s, statutes generally started running when
"the essential facts constituting the claim" occurred,'55 unless "an
attorney ... affirmatively conceal[ed] his negligence."'156  Thus, in
many cases, injured parties were barred from bringing claims before
they even discovered the alleged injury. Worse, the injury may not
have been foreseeable or it may not have even occurred before the
statute extinguished the remedy.5 7  Now, however, most states
require than an actual injury occur before the applicable statute is
triggered.5
8
Second, the duty of care-"generally the next element of a legal
malpractice claim"" 9 -has also undergone significant changes in the
last thirty years. 160  The traditional rule has been that only those
with privity-actual clients-can maintain malpractice actions.1
6'
The origins of this doctrine can be traced to two English cases from
the mid-1800s. 16' The court in one case summed up the policies
underlying the rule when denying standing to a party by commenting,
151. Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107 HARV.
L. REv. 1547, 1558 (1994) [hereinafter Lawyers' Responsibilities].
152. See id.
153. Statutes of limitations are "the most common and effective affirmative defense to
allegations of legal malpractice." Id. at 1559.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see, e.g., Tuck v. Thuesen, 88 Cal. Rptr. 759, 761-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
156. Lawyers' Responsibilities, supra note 151, at 1559 n.49 (citing, for example, Wilder v.
Secor, 33 N.W. 448, 449 (Iowa 1887)).
157. See Ronald E. Mallen, Limitations and the Need for "Damages" in Legal Malpractice
Actions, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 234, 235 (1993).
158. See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1691-93 (1994). For some recent examples, see Washington v. Georges,
837 S.W.2d 146, 147 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) and Richardson v. Denend, 59 Wash. App. 92, 95-
96, 796 P.2d 1192, 1194 (1990), rev. denied, 803 P.2d 1309 (1991).
159. Lawyers' Responsibilities, supra note 151, at 1560.
160. See id.
161. See 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 7.4, at
364 (1993) [hereinafter LEGAL MALPRACTICE].
162. Id. (citing Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842) and Robertson v.
Fleming, 4 Macq. 167 (H.L. 1861)).
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The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who
enter into the contract: if we go one step beyond that, there is no
reason why we should not go fifty. The only real argument in favor
of the action is, that this is a case of hardship; but that might have
been obviated, if the plaintiff had made himself a party to the
contract.16
In recent years, however, courts have generally begun to relax the
privity requirement, but only where there is a "basis for a duty
between the plaintiff and the attorney. ' 164 The two principal theories
under which privity has been expanded are "the California determina-
tion by a multicriteria balancing test,' 16' and a "more traditional
approach ... based upon the concept of a third-party beneficiary
contract."166
Third, more and more attorneys are finding themselves subject to
a standard of care higher than that of an ordinary attorney.167  As
specialization increasingly dominates the realities of modem legal
practice, 168 higher expectations are being placed on attorneys. 161
The current trend is toward holding attorneys to a standard equivalent
to that of "other specialists of ordinary skill and capacity specializing
in the same field."' 7°  This trend "significantly increase the likeli-
hood that [specialists] will be found in breach of their professional
duty.'
7 '
The bottom line is that things that were once certain are certain
no longer. One of the key factors generating uncertainty has been
erosion of the partnership tradition.
D. Erosion of the Partnership Tradition
The practice of law has undergone enormous change in the last
fifteen years. Previously, nearly all law firms were "small shops"
organized as partnerships, in which "like-minded men" '172 worked
mind-numbing hours as associates in order to ascend to the "holy
163. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842).
164. LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 161, § 7.11, at 381.
165. Id. § 7.11, at 382.
166. Id.
167. See id. § 15.7, at 335 (citing FDIC v. O'Melveny and Myers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.
1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994)).
168. See id. § 15.4, at 864.
169. See Lawyers' Responsibilities, supra note 151, at 1563.
170. Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (Ct. App. 1975).
171. Lawyers' Responsibilities, supra note 151, at 1563.
172. Lublin, supra note 30, at 5.
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grail" of a lucrative partnership.'73 The practice of law was an
"essentially collegial occupation, whose essence was defined by the
word 'profession' and which was practiced by individuals either alone
or in firms that prized their members' individuality."' 74  The issue
of liability did not even cross the minds of partners because they knew
their fellow partners well.'75 This partnership tradition traces its
roots to the late 1700s, when incorporation still required a state
legislature's approval. 76
In recent years, however, many firms have become "huge,
anonymous, far-flung enterprises, where making partner doesn't even
guarantee job security.' 1 77 Additionally, attorneys are moving from
firm to firm at an unprecedented rate, often taking clients with
them.17  Such moves are commonly made to gain a partnership
position when one is not available at one's old firm, or to increase a
salary. Put simply, business considerations have come to dominate the
practice of law. 7
9
Further, as firms balloon in size to accommodate multinational
clients and diffuse the costs of expensive equipment, partners are now
liable for the work of hundreds of partners they may never have
met.' 0 As one partner put it, "In 1970, when a predecessor firm
had 23 partners, if one got a divorce, we all cared." With the current
375 partners, "we don't always know and nobody cares unless it affects
the partner's performance in the firm."'' Indeed, it is unlikely that
attorneys practicing twenty-five years ago would have envisioned the
business realities that dominate law practice in the 1990s. Yet
commentators now make statements like, "A partner in Boston
shouldn't have all of his assets at risk because another partner in Dallas
made a mistake. It's simply unfair."'1 2  The very fact that this
statement was made underscores just how many changes have occurred.
173. Id.
174. Davis, supra note 13, at 679.
175. See Lublin. supra note 30, at 5.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Robert W. Hillman, The Law Firm as Jurassic Park: Comments on Howard v. Babcock,
27 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 533, 534 (1994); see also Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Legal
Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J. 151, 152 (1987).
179. Davis, supra note 13, at 679.
180. Alison L. Cowan, Hallmark of the Times: Making Partner Ain't What It Used To Be,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 1, 1992, at 3.
181. Lublin, supra note 30, at 5.
182. Id. (quoting John Hunnicut, lobbyist for the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants).
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E. Malpractice Insurance
Malpractice insurance is one area that reflects many of the above
mentioned changes in the practice of law. Malpractice premiums have
increased at astronomical rates while overall coverage has decreased.
This problem is amplified by malpractice policy provisions that hold
firms liable for work their partners performed at their former firms.
1. Escalating Costs of Insurance
Legal malpractice insurance costs are increasing at a double-digit
rate annually.183 These increases are attributable to several causes,
such as the increase in malpractice suits,"8 4 the S&L crisis,185 and
changes in legal malpractice law. 186  Many attorneys look to the
professional insurance crisis of the mid-1980s, during which many
lawyers' malpractice insurance premiums doubled or even tripled, as
the beginning of this phenomenon.187 This problem of escalating
premiums is worsened each time a large settlement is forced on a firm.
One commentator recently remarked that "Kaye Scholer's staggering
settlement-and a $24 million settlement this spring by ... Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue-may push up legal-malpractice premiums paid
by partners by as much as 50 percent in the next two years.
188
Whatever the cause, the crisis is clearly ongoing: Malpractice
premiums have skyrocketed in recent years, with Southern California
malpractice rates running from $5,000 to $12,000 per attorney
annually.189 Additionally, premiums in all areas of the country
continue to increase twenty percent every year.190
2. Structure of Malpractice Insurance
Malpractice insurance is typically written on a claims-made basis
rather than as "occurrence" coverage. 9' This means that the policy
183. See King, supra note 1, at 28 (explaining that rates are rising at an average of twenty
percent annually).
184. See supra section III.A.
185. See supra section III.B.
186. See supra section III.C.
187. See Mary Ann Galante, Malpractice Rates Zoom, NAT'L L.J., June 3, 1985, at 1, 25.
188. Lublin, supra note 30, at 5.
189. Walters, supra note 126, at D1.
190. See King, supra note 1, at 28.
191. See Richard A. Booth, Time to Rethink Coverage for Malpractice, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Sept. 29, 1992, at 5; Roger M. Marks, Jr. & G. Michael Bourgeois, Malpractice
Insurance-Find Your Way Through the Maze of Options, COMPLEAT LAw., Summer 1995, at
19.
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covers only those claims that are made while the policy is in effect; it
does not necessarily cover all claims arising from one event. Thus, if
partner "A" is negligent, and partner "B" leaves the firm before a
claim is made, partner B's new firm could be liable for part of the
settlement. In fact, a plaintiff would find partner B to be a particularly
attractive defendant because of the addition of another insurance
company. As unfair as this practice sounds, it happens. The
government, in the wake of the thrift bailout, has aggressively gone
after the insurance proceeds of those firms having partners who were
previously partners in firms sued over thrift failures.192 Further, the
potential for these kinds of lawsuits will only increase in light of the
fact that major law firms are going out of business and those still in
business are reducing the number of partners they do have.'93
3. Results of the Insurance Crisis
The results of this ongoing "insurance crisis" are reflected in the
behavior of law firms and liability carriers, and by the economic health
of the country. Insurance companies are sometimes excluding
particular practice areas from coverage altogether, 9 4 and they are
becoming more aggressive when investigating potential insureds. For
example, Myers-Baker & Co., Inc., an insurance company specializing
in lawyers' liability policies, now includes on its application questions
about the firm's office procedures for monitoring liability-incurring
situations. "If in [response to] the question related to docket control
or deadline control systems an attorney says that he has no systems, he
would be turned down and the risk would be denied."'9 5
Law firms themselves are reacting defensively to the insurance
crisis. For example, at Los Angeles-based Kindell & Anderson, each
new file goes through eight steps in the liability review process.1
96
Additionally, some firms have dropped existing high-risk clients or
refused to accept business from others. 97 Further, in a disturbing
trend, many firms, especially small to medium size firms, are now
"going bare," or operating without any insurance.'9" These firms are
doing so both because of spiraling costs and because many insurers
192. Booth, supra note 191, at 5.
193. See Lublin, supra note 30, at 5.
194. King, supra note 1, at 28.
195. Id. (quoting Holly Myers, Executive Vice President at Myers-Baker & Co., Inc.).
196. Id.
197. See Walters, supra note 126, at D1.
198. See Gene R. Barrett, New AICPA Chairman Sees a Bright Future for the Profession, J.
AccT., Dec. 1992, at 86, 87.
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simply no longer cover professionals due to the enormous amount of
uncertainty and risk involved.'99
The costs of the crisis are not confined to insurers and law firms,
however. Professional liability lawsuits cost the country $17.8 billion
per year. 00 According to a study commissioned by the American
Tort Reform Association, litigation against professionals will
- cost the nation 224,000 jobs per year between 1992 and 1996;
- increase the federal budget deficit by an average of $3.7 billion per
year;
- cut state and local government surpluses $1.2 billion per year; and
- reduce real output in manufacturing by $6.9 billion per year.20'
Thus, the changes that the malpractice crisis has thrust upon the
legal profession are enormous. The increase in the number of
malpractice suits, coupled with the savings and loan crisis and evolving
notions of lawyer responsibilities, have created an untenable situation.
However, many of the economic factors that have driven the legal
market to where it is today also dictate that the concerns identified by
critics of the new forms are misplaced.
IV. THE REGULATING IMPACT OF THE MARKET
Although attorneys have sought relief from increased malpractice
liability by organizing as LLPs and LLCs, troubling questions remain.
Will attorneys lose their incentive to regulate each other? Will clients
who suffer real and serious wrongs be left without a remedy? Will the
practice of law degenerate into an environment where liability for one's
own actions becomes a meaningless concern?
199. See Thomas McCarrol, Who's Countirg, TIME, Apr. 13, 1992, at 48 (although
McCarrol's article emphasizes the accounting profession, professionals generally are considered).
200. Bill Atkinson, A Determined Defender of Lawyers, Accountants, AM. BANKER, Aug. 20,
1992, at 2.
201. Id. Atkinson's article also provides a description of the study.
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Economic theory,2 °2 which asserts that people make those
choices that maximize their personal wealth," 3 "is a valuable tool for
understanding, interpreting, and creating law."2" The theory is
grounded in "neoclassical price theory, or microeconomics."205 The
theory indicates that the answers to questions such as those raised
above are "No," as such alternatives result in an inefficient allocation
of resources, which is counter to the way in which professionals such
as attorneys generally behave.0 '
Economic theory dictates that the quality of legal work will not be
diminished by allowing attorneys to utilize LLPs and LLCs to limit
their liability for several reasons. First, attorneys will work to produce
error-free, high quality legal services for their clients because they want
to retain employment positions and clients. Second, attorneys are
deterred from negligent behavior because they have invested substantial
resources in their careers and reputations, and will thus act to protect
their accumulations of wealth, not risk them. Third, attorneys will
continue to monitor each other to ensure continued malpractice
coverage, which is a requirement under most LLP and LLC statutes.
Further, imposing unlimited liability on attorneys does not always
guarantee attorney self-monitoring. It does, however, guarantee that
202. One of the more prominent adherents to this approach is Judge Richard Posner. Judge
Posner, who was appointed to the federal bench December 4, 1981, is a prolific writer, having
authored numerous books, appellate decisions, and over 100 articles. Gordon Crovitz, Winds of
Change on the Bench, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 15, 1985, at 24. He also wields great influence-his
opinions having been cited in approximately 1,000 cases. Id.
Although economic analysis has traditionally been associated with conservative political
views, scholars as a whole have not limited its application in that manner. Economic analysis has,
for example, been applied in radical legal analysis. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The
Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131, 1138-39 (1981). Throughout this Comment, the terms
"economic" and "economics" will refer to neoclassical microeconomics. Alternative schools of
thought, such as Marxist economics, are inapplicable to the analysis used in this Comment.
203. See George M. Cohen, Comment, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of
Law: The View From the Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (1985). Although Mr. Cohen
wrote his article while a student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, he was also a
Ph.D. candidate in economics. Id. at 1117 (author's biography). See also Whitney Cunningham,
Note, Testing Posner's Strong Theory of Wealth Maximization, 81 GEO. L.J. 141, 160 (1992).
204. See Cohen, supra note 203, at 1117.
205. Id. Another commentator has explained that "[t]he behavioral claim of economics
establishes the consensus view that 'law is rational, and hence analyzable by economic concepts."'
Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 611 (1988)
(quoting R. COOTER & T. ULEN, EcONOMICS OF LAW 12 (1988)).
206. See infra notes 207-222 and accompanying text. It is important to remember that
individual negligence, fraud, or malpractice of any kind are not excused under the new
organizational forms. Attorneys who commit acts subjecting them to liability under current PC
or partnership statutes are still personally liable under LLP and LLC statutes. See, e.g., TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08(a) (West 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.125 (1994).
See supra notes 93-95 and 120-122 and accompanying text.
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monitoring costs will be externalized. Moreover, because consumers
receive the same protection from firms organized as LLPs and LLCs
as they do from solo practitioners, arguments that LLP and LLC
forms treat clients unfairly are untenable.
A. The Laws of Demand and Supply
The foundation of economic theory can be found in two hypothe-
ses. 207  The first hypothesis holds that "resources are scarce in
relation to people's desires to consume them. '208  Consequently,
"people must make choices between various resources or activi-
ties.' '2' The second hypothesis holds that "people behave rationally
when making decisions." 2'0  These two hypotheses drive the view
held by law and economics theorists "that rational, self-interested
calculations of individual cost and benefit is the key to understanding
and evaluating legal relations and various rule systems. 211
The result is the "law of demand" :212 The consumption of
goods is inversely proportional to their price.2" 3 The corollary to the
law of demand is the "law of supply."214  Simply stated, "when the
price of a good increases, producers will supply more of it." 215 The
laws of supply and demand form the central tenet of economic theory
regarding social behavior: "[U]nder competitive conditions, free trade
among individuals will result in a socially optimal allocation of
resources. ' 216 Thus, law and economics indicates that "rules of law
[are] like prices and legal actors [are] like perfectly rational individu-
als. "217
Economic theory dictates that the average attorney will strive to
produce error-free, high quality legal services for her clients regardless
of the liability structure under which she practices. By doing so, the
attorney makes a choice that will maximize her personal benefit-she
207. This analysis is taken from a similar economic discussion in Cohen, supra note 203.
208. Cohen, supra note 203, at 1119.
209. Id. Economists refer to these choices as "tradeoffs." Id. (quoting P. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMICS 18-23 (10th ed. 1976)).
210. Id.
211. Minda, supra note 205, at 610-11.
212. Cohen, supra note 203, at 1119.
213. Thus, the more expensive a good is, the less it will be consumed and vice versa. See
id. at 1119-20.
214. Id. at 1119.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1120.
217. Minda, supra note 205, at 611 (quoting Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great Image of
Authority, 36 STAN. L. REV. 349, 353 (1984)).
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chooses to do that which is likely to cause her firm to continue her
employment, which in turn provides her with monetary resources. In
today's highly competitive market, doing the opposite can be danger-
ous, as many firms are cutting back the number of partners they
have .2 1  Associates are likewise driven in this regard, as failure to
produce high quality legal work is likely to cost one a partnership
position and, hence, the greater rewards that accompany it. The
bottom line is that personal choices are shaped by the market.
Attorneys, like everyone else, are most concerned with what will affect
them directly, and in that regard LLCs and LLPs change nothing.
The economics of the market also indicate that clients will force
attorneys to maintain their current level of ethics and quality of
practice. Because the statutes generally all require that indicia of the
limited liability form, such as "LLP" or "LLC," be included in the
211 ilfirm name, clients will be on notice of the restrictions, as all
business cards, letterhead, and other promotional materials will have
the identifying characteristic. Thus, clients can shop around for firms
that do or do not opt for limited liability, just as they currently do for
firms that do or do not carry malpractice insurance, which is not
required by statute in most states. Because clients have scarce
resources in relation to their desires to consume them, they do not
want to needlessly expend them on legal services. The rational choice
for a client is to discontinue an employment situation with attorneys
who provide substandard service.
The law of supply provides that producers of a service will act to
"maximize 220 their profits by providing services that will generate
the greatest long-term income. Good work generates the most income
for attorneys, not fraudulent or negligent work that misses filing
deadlines, overlooks elements needed to prove causes of action, or has
other omissions that decrease expected returns to the client or
needlessly raise costs.
Moreover, no one is suggesting that all firms must, or even
should, reorganize under limited liability statutes. If law firms
practicing as LLPs or LLCs prove to be as bad as critics contend, they
will, theoretically, go out of business, as those that do not choose
limited liability forms will get the majority of clients. It appears,
however, that those firms currently operating as LLCs and LLPs are
218. See Lublin, supra note 30, at 5.
219. See supra notes 85 and 111.
220. Cohen, supra note 203, at 1119.
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not experiencing a drop in their market share, as firms continue to
convert at an unprecedented rate.221
Firms invest considerable resources in developing their reputa-
tions. This stake provides an incentive toward minimizing malprac-
tice,222 as loss of professional reputation will result in decreased
future profits and the loss of funds invested in good will. Consequent-
ly, if the overall quality of work were decreasing, and firms felt that
their reputations were threatened, they would revert back to traditional
forms, as the rational economic actor would not expend scarce
resources only to counteract them with wasteful activity. After all,
lower quality work, whatever the cause, will lead clients to go
elsewhere, a situation that firms find intolerable.
B. The Deterrent Theory of Criminal Behavior
The deterrent theory of criminal behavior and punishment is a
useful analogue to apply to these theories of limited liability. For two
reasons, the theory applies to attorneys remarkably well.223 First,
attorneys often commit economic crimes.224 In fact, the vast majority
of attorney misconduct is centered around economic gain."S Second,
attorneys are likely to have a high level of understanding of the
ramifications of their actions, both for themselves and for their clients.
Attorneys, as a group, are typically more educated and sophisticated
than the average criminal and are, thus, more careful and accurate
when balancing the potential costs and benefits before acting.
Deterrent theory allows various levels of sophistication to be
considered when analyzing behavior. One author has illustrated the
deterrent theory of criminal behavior in terms of two forms of
rationalization, the strong form and the weak form.226  The strong
form of rationalization assumes that the person considering criminal
221. See Reuben, supra note 10, at 55; N. Scott Murphy, Note, It's Nothing Personal: The
Public Costs of Limited Liability Law Partnerships, 71 IND. L.J. 201, 207 (1995); Lawrence, supra
note 51, at 212.
222. Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership,
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 435 (1992); see also Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
223. That deterrence can, at this time, be applied specifically to attorneys is not critical to
the underlying thesis; however, the clear weight of current evidence does hold that deterrence
works against the general criminal population, and specifically against white collar crimes. See
infra notes 236-243 and accompanying text.
224. See Stephen G. Ben6, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to
Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 907, 924 (1991).
225. See id. at 923-24.
226. These terms are used only for convenience. They are borrowed from a similar
economic discussion in Ben6, supra note 224, at 921.
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activity is a rational actor who will make what he believes to be his
optimal choice concerning various resources or activities. He realizes
that he does not have unlimited resources, and in deciding how to
utilize them, he rationally balances (perhaps unconsciously) the returns
(psychological and monetary) against the costs (potential failure and
foregone opportunities) available from a variety of activities, both legal
and illegal.227 Under this strong form, the potential criminal sums
up and weighs the costs against the benefits, after discounting each by
the likelihood of occurrence. This calculation is, of course, complex,
and as such is probably not done on a highly technical level.2
The weak form of rationalization is somewhat less technical in
nature. Under this form, the act of weighing costs and benefits is done
on a subconscious level.229 Thus, potential criminals respond in
some predictable manner to incentives, or in more simple terms, they
are deterrable.230 The weak form of rationalization simply provides
for a downward-sloping supply curve. 23' Because the criminal has
limited resources, a decrease in the utility of an action will cause him
to engage in a particular activity less, in relation to his other choices.
"Thus the assumption is that people respond to directions of change
in the relevant variables, not that they have complete knowledge of the
magnitude of these variables."232
One does not need a doctorate in economics to be influenced in
this manner. If the potential benefit of an action is outweighed by the
chances and consequences of being caught, a potential criminal will be
deterred. Because the actual calculating of risk and reward can be
quite complex, most actors make these choices instinctively, or under
the weak form. That is, they behave in a predictable, rational manner.
Enforcement agencies (such as courts) deter the potential criminal
by raising the cost of failure (the punishment faced, for example),
227. See Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes Punishable
by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479, 484 (1975); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968), reprinted in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1, 9 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974). Although
the title of this work indicates that the analysis applies to criminal actions only, the author
observed that the article is "sufficiently general to cover all violations ... tax evasion, the so-
called white collar crimes, and traffic and other violations." Id. at 3.
228. See Ben6, supra note 224, at 921.
229. See id. at 922.
230. See Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis, in
ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 68, 70-71 (Gary Becker and William
M. Landes eds., 1976).
231. See Ben6, supra note 224, at 922.
232. Paul H. Rubin, The Economics of Crime, 28 ATLANTIC ECON. REV. 38, reprinted in
ECONOMICS OF CRIME 13, 16 (Ralph Andreano & John J. Siegfried eds., 1980).
[Vol. 19:349
1996] Limited Liability Partnerships and Companies 379
multiplied by the percentage chance he will fail. The cost scheme
exists on a basic level. A criminal is less likely to expend resources on
a course of action if there is a ninety-five percent probability of
detection versus a five percent probability of detection. Similarly, a
week in jail is much less likely to deter the criminal than a twenty-year
prison sentence. Increasing either variable should then work to deter
the criminal, but with decreasing marginal returns.233
Although some scholars remain skeptical about deterrence theory,
most scholars accept it as true.23  As the National Academy of
Sciences noted,
Our reluctance to draw stronger conclusions [from current empirical
studies on the deterrent effects of punishment] does not imply
support for the position that deterrence does not exist, since the
evidence certainly favors a proposition supporting deterrence more
than it favors one asserting that deterrence is absent.23
Due to the nature of their profession, attorneys are probably more
deterrable than the general criminal population. Because of the large
career investments, the status of the profession, and the "vital
importance of a lawyer's reputation to his career, ' 236 they have more
to lose than the average criminal. 7 Consequently, attorneys, as a
group, are more likely to make the rational and more cautious decision
of protecting large aggregations of wealth rather than risking them.238
In a study examining the loss of income associated with embezzlement
and fraud crimes (among others), John Lott concluded that (1) the
largest penalty suffered by the white-collar criminal is the loss of
233. See DAVID J. PYLE, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 40
(1983); Rubin, supra note 232, at 15.
234. See Beni, supra note 224, at 923-24 n.83.
235. Committee on Research on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Assembly of
Behavioral and Social Sciences, National Research Council, Report of the Panel: Summary, in
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
ON CRIME RATES 1, 7 (A. Blumstein et al. eds., 1978).
236. Ben6, supra note 224, at 925.
237. John R. Lott, Jr., Do We Punish High Income Criminals [T]oo Heavily? 22 (July
1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
238. Although this seems a logical progression, my research has not discovered studies
specifically focusing on attorneys. However, commentators have pointed out that white-collar
criminals are deterrable. See, e.g., William J. Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness
of Legal Sanctions, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 703, 709-10 (although the author fails to compare white-
collar criminals to other criminal groups); Becker, supra note 227, at 9.
One commentator has observed that "evidence is especially lacking concerning the impact
of sanction threats upon various types of people." CHARLES R. TITTLE, THE ECONOMICS OF
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 85, 100 (S. Rottenberg ed., 1973).
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earnings rather than the fine or prison term imposed,3 9 and (2) the
loss of income is steeply progressive, so that the higher the level of
preconviction income, the greater the postconviction decline.240
Lott's observations are of particular importance in predicting
attorney behavior. Given that the practice of law has become more
commercialized over time,24' the financial aspects and rewards have
become more and more important to individual attorneys.242 Because
of this, financial deterrents, which have the greatest impact on white-
collar criminals in general, seem to have the greatest impact on the
average attorney.
Many financial deterrents exist for attorneys. For example,
individuals are still personally liable for negligence or malfeasance.
Further, as firm assets and malpractice policies are still available to
satisfy judgments, individual attorneys continue to risk significant
income reductions because their income is directly tied to the firm's
financial health. Moreover, successful malpractice actions are likely to
increase malpractice premiums, which will also affect future income.
Finally, because individual attorneys with greater preconviction income
will have a greater postconviction decline, more experienced senior
attorneys, who generally have more knowledge and ability to imple-
ment change, will be the most motivated to monitor other attorneys
within their own firms. Consequently, arguments which assume that
a decrease in liability will result in either decreased monitoring of one's
partners or a decrease in the overall quality of legal work are mis-
placed.
Furthermore, much of an attorney's job is balancing the costs and
benefits of possible courses of action. Presumably then, attorneys are
both more comfortable and better than the average criminal at making
such determinations. Indeed, because attorneys are aware of factors
such as the level of their own personal assets, the level of malpractice
insurance their firm carries, and the level of the firm's assets, they are
in a unique position to measure the monetary and reputational costs of
being sanctioned for misconduct.243
239. Lott, supra note 237, at 21.
240. Id. at 21-22.
241. See supra notes 172-182 and accompanying text.
242. See Lublin, supra note 30, at 5.
243. See Ben(, supra note 224, at 924-25.
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C. Insurance Needs Drive the Market
Malpractice insurance is becoming more expensive and more
difficult to obtain. As one commentator noted, "[F]irms are going to
have to pay increasing attention to liability underwriting, and firms
without tight controls inside will find it difficult to get." '244 Because
many LLC and LLP statutes require that attorneys carry malpractice
insurance or its equivalent,24 attorneys will not let the quality of
their work slide. Bad work will quickly equal no protection.
Additionally, to the extent that salaries and bonuses of all
attorneys in a firm are affected by the cost the firm pays for liability
insurance, the incentive to monitor one's partners is still high. As
rational economic actors, attorneys will act in a manner that will
prevent wasteful allocation of the firm's economic resources. Further,
as firms must carry insurance or its equivalent under many of the new
statutes, the incentive is even higher.
D. The Solo Practitioner v. The Large Firm
The contrasting abilities of solo practitioners and large firms to
pay claims provides another interesting perspective on the issue of
limited liability forms for attorneys. When a potential consumer hires
a solo practitioner, the solo practitioner's liability may extend to the
assets of his practice, his malpractice policy, and his personal as-
sets.246 Yet that is precisely the same kind of protection that con-
sumers get from large firms who are practicing as LLPs or LLCs.
In contrast, a partner in a large firm that is organized as a
traditional partnership has partners who may, in certain circumstances,
also be personally liable.247  Additionally, the firm assets that other
partners have helped build up are also available to help settle claims
against any one attorney.248 Thus, attorneys who have partners can
potentially be punished merely for having partners, something from
which solo practitioners are immune.
244. Reuben, supra note 10, at 55-56.
245. See supra notes 91 and 113.
246. As explained earlier, no organizational form absolves individuals from their own
malpractice. See supra notes 93-95 and 120-122 and accompanying text.
247. See Lawrence, supra note 51, at 211.
248. See id.
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E. Will Attorneys Continue to Monitor Each Other?
Many of the ethical restrictions that forbid professionals from
limiting their liability were drafted at least fifty years ago, before the
advent of firms with hundreds of lawyers in many cities and states.249
The traditional argument, of course, is that attorneys who monitor each
other reduce problems by regulating each other.5 Joint and several
liability for partners was thought to motivate others in the firm to pay
attention to what their partners were doing and "supervise" each other.
By limiting liability, the incentive to regulate is thought to be
gone. M In firms that are scattered across states or even the entire
country, however, most partners usually do not work closely enough
to monitor each other even if they know each other.
Many of the policies the regulations were designed to achieve are,
thus, no longer reached by preventing limited liability. How is
someone in the tax department of the Seattle or Houston office going
to have any idea what someone in the land use department in
Washington, D.C. or New York is doing? Furthermore, it is difficult
to see how holding a Washington, D.C., land use attorney liable for a
tax mistake made in Seattle is going to increase the Seattle lawyer's
incentive to supervise her partner. Although it may be argued that
partners can pursue internal measures to regulate one another, even to
the extreme of resigning if higher levels of professional responsibility
are not adopted, that argument does not take into account the types of
liability that frequently have been imposed. 2  In the Kaye Scholer
case, for example, the firm went as far as getting an ethics opinion
253from a national expert. In cases such as that one, additional
monitoring would be of no value.
Further, as the law of diminishing returns2 4 indicates, additional
monitoring may not be particularly useful. To the extent that
monitoring involves second-guessing complex professional decisions,
it may become counterproductive by imposing higher transactional
costs upon clients.255 Indeed, because the practice of law has become
249. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 865 (1965); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 85-1514 (1985).
250. See Susan S. Fortney, Am I My Partner's Keeper? Peer Review in Law Firms, 66 U.
COLO. L. REv. 329, 370 (1995).
251. See supra notes 172-182.
252. See supra notes 3-13 and 131-135.
253. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
255. See Ribstein, supra note 222, at 435; see also infra notes 257-260 and accompanying
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highly commercialized, and because malpractice insurance and all of
the assets of a firm are still on the line, attorneys continue to have an
incentive to regulate each other to prevent inadvertent mistakes.
Additionally, with escalating legal malpractice costs, 256 attorneys
today have an increased incentive to ensure that more firm assets do
not have to be spent for future malpractice coverage. Finally, as firms
routinely dedicate funds to building firm reputation, the economic
motivation to monitor one's partners remains high.
E The Forcing of Massive Externalization
Basic economic theory indicates that when a market-driven
enterprise such as a law firm incurs a major expense, the probable
result is that the business will externalize the cost, passing it along to
clients. Further, it is likely that when a major expense is avoidable by
the adoption of a practice, that practice will be adopted, especially if
the cost can be passed along to the consumer or client.
As one might expect, exactly that has started happening in some
areas of law practice. Some attorneys who represent financial
institutions now privately talk about spending hours "creating
obsessively detailed memoranda about what they have told their clients,
in case they are questioned later."2 7 They also bill for endless "due
diligence" investigations into their clients' financial health, just to be
on the safe side.2"' All of this does little or nothing to actually help
the client. Creating memoranda on what an attorney told her client
does nothing in terms of helping the client solve the situation that
drove the client to the attorney in the first place. Additionally, the
extra fees generated by time spent creating such memoranda only make
attorneys that much more expensive and inaccessible to the public.
Additionally, mandatory unlimited liability for attorneys, in some
ways, artificially raises the cost of legal services to the public.
Exposing attorneys to personal risk for debts arising out of contracts
made by partners imposes significant risk-bearing and monitoring costs
on partners.25 9 To the extent that these costs to the client can be
lowered-and the evidence indicates that decreased liability lowers
them-it would be desirable, for this reason as well, to allow LLPs and
LLCs. Finally, costs from professional liability litigation, as noted
256. See supra notes 167-172 and accompanying text.
257. Stevens, supra note 2, at B12.
258. Id.
259. See Ribstein, supra note 222, at 432; see also David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort
Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1590-95 (1991).
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above,26 have imposed significant burdens on society as a whole,
something that could also be reduced by a decrease in liability.
V. CONCLUSION
The malpractice crisis in this country is having a significant
impact on attorneys, and the organizational forms traditionally available
to them have amplified the problems. Further, traditional forms ignore
the dramatic changes that have overtaken the legal profession in recent
years. The LLP and LLC forms are the vehicles that can help ease
these problems and enable attorneys to successfully practice into the
next century. Although commentators argue otherwise, many states
have realized that changes need to be made, and their legislatures have
acted to that end.
When examined from the law and economics perspective, it
becomes evident that the traditional arguments against limited liability
are outdated. The new limited liability forms will not cause work
quality to deteriorate or leave clients with legitimate claims without a
significant remedy. To deny attorneys the ability to organize as LLPs
and LLCs is to ignore the realities of the marketplace and perpetuate
current problems and inequities. As one commentator stated,
"Professional Liability ... Malpractice suits ... Megaverdicts. The
numbers are mind-boggling." '261 Denying protection to attorneys
must stop.
260. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
261. King, supra note 1, at 28.
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